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CONDITIONAL SALES -
Applications of Automobile Sales Statute,
Civil Code Section 2982
By NORMAN LEW*
ONE OF THE great phenomena of the business world in the past
two decades, has been the purchase of commodities on credit plans.
Unfortunately, many of these business transactions have been unsavory
and legislatures have been called upon to aid the sometimes naive
purchaser. The purpose of this article is to examine the California
statute' governing the conditional sale contract for the purchase of
motor vehicles; its requirements and purpose; 2 and the effect on the
contract and parties where there has been a violation of the statute.
Requirements of the Statute
The California statute governing the conditional sale of a motor
vehicle was first enacted in 19453 and since that date has been amended
four times.4 Subdivision (a) of section 2982 recites the necessary
provisions the conditional sale contract must contain.5 Subdivision
(b) requires the issuance of the necessary policies within thirty days
after the execution of the contract where the contract balance in-
cludes any charge for insurance. These two subdivisions constitute
the formal requirements of the statute. Subdivision (c) limits the
amount of the time price differential.6 Subdivision (d) allows the
*Member, Second Year class.
'CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982.
2 See a comparison of purposes of § 2982 and the Unruh Act CAL. CiV. CODE
§§ 1801-12.9, Note, Installment Sales: Purpose of Unruh Act; Comparison With Automo-
bile Sales Legislation, p. 312 infra. The Unruh Act does not apply to the conditional sale
of automobiles.
3 Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 1030, § 2, p. 1992.
4 Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1594, § 1, p. 2842; Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 342, § 2, p. 776; Cal.
Stat. 1957, ch. 613, § 1, p. 1822; and Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1466, § 2, p. 3763.
5 Subd. (a) requires the conditional sale contract to be in writing and signed by the
parties. The contract itself must recite the following items; 1) the cash price; 2) amount
of the buyer's down payment; 3) amount unpaid on the cash price; 4) the cost to the
buyer of any insurance where the premium is included in the contract balance; 5) item-
ization of any amounts paid to any public officer as fees by the seller or his assignee;
6) amount of unpaid balance; 7) amount of the time price differential; 8) the contract bal-
ance owed; 9) the number, amount, and date of paying the installments remaining on the
contract balance; 10) the names and addresses of all persons to whom the notice as re-
quired under subd. (g) of the section is to be sent.
6 The amount of the time price differential cannot exceed one per cent of the unpaid
balance multiplied by the number of months elapsing between the date of the contract
and the due date of the last installment, or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater.
For a discussion as to why the time price differential is not within the common law
usury laws, see Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68
YALE L.J. 839, 867 (1958). See also, Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163
P.2d 869 (1945); Wilson v. J. E. French Co., 214 Cal. 188, 4 P.2d 537 (1931); Rice v.
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buyer a refund credit where he satisfies the indebtedness in full prior
to maturity. The refund credit is allowed notwithstanding any pro-
vision in the conditional sale contract. The seller, however, is enti-
tled to a minimum "finance charge" of a sum not exceeding twenty-five
dollars. No refund credit amounting to less than one dollar need be
made. These two subdivisions constitute the substantive requirements
of the statute.
Subdivision (e) provides that if the seller, except as the result of
an accidental or bona fide error in computation, violates any provision
of subdivisions (c) or (d) (time price and refund credit provisions),
the contract shall be unenforceable, except by a bona fide purchaser
for value, and the buyer may recover from the seller in a civil action
the total amount paid on the contract balance by him to the seller
or his assignee.
Subdivision (f) also gives the buyer a civil action where the
holder of the contract violates (d) (refund credit provision) for the
recovery of the total amount paid on the contract balance. Subdivi-
sion (g) requires the giving of five days written notice of an intent
to resell a repossessed motor vehicle. It further provides that if per-
sons liable on the contract do not satisfy their indebtedness during
this five day period, they will also be liable for any deficiency realized
after the sale of the repossessed motor vehicle. Subdivision (h) pro-
hibits any provision in the contract which will enable the seller to
accelerate the maturity of any part of or all of the amount owing, or
to repossess the motor vehicle. The only exception is where the buyer
has defaulted in the performance of any of his obligations under the
contract.
The decision of Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co.,7 the pioneer
case after the enactment of the statute in 1945, held that the lan-
guage of the statute was mandatory." This has been affirmed in sub-
sequent decisions 9 and there is no doubt there must be compliance
without discretion on the seller's part. The statute sets forth seven
subdivisions, but is basically divided into two major areas. The re-
quirements of (c) and (d) are "substantive" (time price differential
and refund credit respectively), while (a) and (b) are merely "for-
mal." Thus, where the seller violates the "substantive" requirements,
it is a "substantive" violation and non-compliance with the "formal"
requirements is a "formal" violation. The effect of one or the other
is not without differing implications.
The Carter case not only decided that the language of the statute
Dunlap, 205 Cal. 133, 270 Pac. 196 (1928).
7 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
8 As to what statutory language usually is mandatory, see 45 CAL. Jun. 2d Statutes
§§ 156-7; 50 Am. Jun. Statutes §§ 18-32.
0 Bratta v. Caruso Car Co., 166 Cal. App. 2d 661, 333 P.2d 807 (1958); Foster v.
Masters Pontiac Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 481, 322 P.2d 592 (1958).
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was mandatory, but that the ". . . obvious purpose of the statute is
to protect purchasers of motor vehicles against excessive charges by
requiring full disclosure of all items of cost."' 0 The purpose, thus, is
directed at the philosophy of disclosure and to aid the unaware buyer.
Hazards and Solutions
The hazards facing the conditional buyer are numerous." A com-
mon pitfall is the "balloon note," where the first few installments
are relatively small and the final installment large. The buyer, in this
situation, is at the mercy of the seller if he is unable to pay this last
installment. The seller, if a chattel mortgage was given as security,
may foreclose, or he may choose to repossess and resell. This is a
hardship on the buyer who has paid all the installments except the
large last one. The California statute attempts to alleviate this hard-
ship. Subdivision (a) requires the disclosure of the number, amount,
and date of paying the installments remaining on the contract balance
be recited in the contract. Thus, the buyer is aware of this large install-
ment as the last payment.
Another common pitfall that has plagued the conditional buyer
is the acceleration provision. The theory behind this type of provision
is that the seller feels "insecure" as to whether or not future payments
will be forthcoming. Thus, if he feels insecure, he may accelerate
the maturity date and demand the full price. Whether or not a seller
is insecure has, at times, been left to the seller's discretion. Some
cases leave the seller as the sole judge of the facts and so long as he
acts in good faith, he need not even show reasonable grounds for this
insecure feeling.12 Other courts allow acceleration only where the
creditor had good reason to think and in good faith thinks he is inse-
cure. 13 Still other courts have decided that the creditor must act in
good faith and upon the facts, actually find his position insecure. 14
These results exemplify the predicament of a conditional buyer. One
must not, however, lose sight of the legal characteristics of the condi-
tional sale contract.1 5 Without legislative limitations, parties are free to
contract respecting the sale of property on any terms and the condi-
tional seller may even demand a greater amount with deferred pay-
ments than the cash price.
16
10 Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., supra note 7, at 573, 203 P.2d at 764.
11 See Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL
L.Q. 38 (1958).
12 Thorp v. Fleming, 78 Kan. 237, 96 Pac. 470 (1908), Johnson v. Thayer, 53 Ohio
App. 25, 4 N.E.2d 172 (1936).
13 Parks v. Phillips, 71 Nev. 313, 289 P.2d 1053 (1955); Woodruff v. Stahl, 126
Wash. 184, 217 Pac. 1013 (1923).
14 Flinn v. Fredrickson, 89 Neb. 563, 131 N.W. 934 (1911).
15 See e.g., VOLD, SALES 281 (2d ed. 1959).
16 Imperial Thrift & Loan v. Ferguson, 155 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 866, 318 P.2d 566
(1957).
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But, California has placed limitations with respect to acceleration
provisions in the conditional sale of a motor vehicle contract. Through
subdivision (h), the hazard of acceleration is eliminated. This sub-
division expressly forbids any acceleration provision regardless of the
terms the parties agreed on. The only exception to this is where the
buyer has defaulted.
Where the seller repossesses and resells because of the buyer's
default, the seller must apply the proceeds to the balance due.17 He
must account to the buyer for any excess that may be available.
The case of Hill v. Dominquez'8 illustrates another type of hazard
confronting the buyer with respect to a resale after repossession by
the seller. The seller and the buyer contracted for the conditional
sale of an automobile. The contract was then assigned by the seller.
The assignee then assigned to a second assignee who repossessed the
automobile upon the buyer's default. It was then delivered to the
first assignee and sold to still another party for 1400 dollars. It was ulti-
mately sold again for the total cash price of 2,834 dollars. An action
by the seller was then instituted for the balance due from the original
buyer, which was only 2,310 dollars.. Plaintiff contended that the
value of the automobile was only 1400 dollars, -and therefore he was
entitled to the deficiency from the original buyer. Yet, through a
series of assignments and a "resale," the seller had actually sold the
automobile for more than was to be paid had the buyer not defaulted.
The appellate department of the superior court held it was error
to have excluded evidence of the amount of the last sale, which indi-
cated the market value to be more than twice the amount for which
it was sold to the party paying 1400 dollars. It was held to be per-
suasive proof that the seller failed to exercise ordinary care to obtain
the best price available and thus, did not discharge a legal duty to
the buyer. It should be noted that the party which paid 1400 dollars
was a corporation associated with the seller, and all the "assignees"
outside of the repossessing corporation were doing business at the
same location.
Effect of the Contract Where Seller Violates Statute
Subdivision (e) expressly provides that where the seller violates
either (c) or (d) (time price differential and refund credit provi-
sions), the contract will be unenforceable by the seller and the buyer
shall have a civil action against him for the total amount paid on the
contract balance. There is no mention in the statute on its enforce-
ability where the seller violates subdivisions (a) or (b). In the Carter
case, it was decided that "formal' violations of the statute will also
render the conditional sale contract unenforceable and the buyer may
recover all payments made under the contract. With the exception
17 Vo., supra note 15, at 295.
18 138 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 891, 291 P.2d 203 (1955).
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of a single case' 9 which has since been repudiated, 20 California has
shown consistency in holding that a violation of the statute by the
seller renders the contract unenforceable.
When the statute governing the conditional sale of motor vehicles
was first enacted, the question of what was considered "unenforce-
able" 21 was asked. The answer to this query is all important for it
holds the key to the parties' rights. Where there has been a violation
and the seller cannot enforce the contract, should he be allowed the
right to repossess the motor vehicle upon the buyer's default? Or, in
spite of the buyer's default, should there be a forfeiture to the buyer?22
Keeping in mind the nature of the conditional sale, where the seller
retains legal title as security for the purchase price, should the courts
disregard this right and allow the buyer to retain the motor vehicle
without further installment payments?
Forfeiture has been looked upon with disfavor in the California
courts. 23 Granted neither party will forfeit their consideration, but
what is meant by "unenforceable," remains to be answered. In the
most recent case in point, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle,24
the court decided that although the seller "formally" violated the
statute, he could nevertheless enforce the legal provision for the re-
turn of the automobile upon a buyer's default, in part overruling
Williams v. Caruso Enterprises.25 In the latter case, it was decided
that the party causing the contract to become illegal may not main-
tain an action on it even though the other party had received and
retained everything he was to receive under the contract. "Unen-
forceable" thus, only refers to the seller's inability to demand further
installment payments from the buyer. It does not, however, interfere
with the seller's right to enforce the legal provision for return of the
automobile where the buyer refuses to continue payments and refuses
also to give up possession.
Parties' Rights and Liability Upon Seller's Violation
To say the contract is unenforceable does not, in itself, resolve
who is entitled to what. The court in the Kyle case not only con-
curred in the interpretation of the legislative intent first expounded
19 Millick v. Peer, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 894, 279 P.2d 212 (1955) holding that a
violation of subd. (a) or (b) of CAL. CIV. CODE § 2982 does not render the conditional
sale contract unenforceable.
20 Baum v. Aleman, 139 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 929., 293 P.2d 162 (1956).
21 See York and Wicks, Personal Property; Conditional Sale Contracts: Automobiles,
23 So. CAL. L. REv. 39 (1949).
22 See Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 362 (1950).
23 See Redd v. Garford Motor Truck Co., 205 Cal. 245, 270 Pac. 447 (1928); Knas-
ton v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 124 Cal. 74, 56 Pac. 773 (1899); Miller v. Modem Motor
Co. of Glendale, 107 Cal. App. 38, 290 Pac. 122 (1930).
24 54 Cal. 2d -- , 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1960).
25 140 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 295 P.2d 592 (1956).
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in the Carter case, but added to it. The statute is for the protection
of the buyer26 who may be unaware of excessive charges. But this is
not to be interpreted in such a way as to give the buyer a windfall.
This immediately indicates that even though the seller violates the
statute, he is not to suffer forfeiture of the motor vehicle.
While there has been confusion as to whether or not the seller
should be allowed an action for return of the vehicle, no such con-
fusion exists with respect to the buyer's right. He is not considered
in pan delicto with the seller and may rescind the conditional sale
contract.27 He cannot, however, both simultaneously avoid the con-
ditional sale contract and assert rights in the conditionally sold ve-
hicle.28 Thus, although the purchaser is entitled to recover what he
has parted with, he cannot at the same time retain the vehicle. The
Williams case even went so far as to say that the buyer could not
maintain an action to recover money he had given up unless the ve-
hicle was repossessed or he had offered to return it. There is little
dispute that a person who receives money from another under a void
contract has been unjustly enriched and for that reason, the latter
is permitted to recover from the former.29 The seller, then who fails
to comply with the statute is required to return whatever considera-
tion the buyer has given to him. In return, the purchaser must give
up the vehicle.
The problem becomes complicated where the conditional seller
assigns the contract after receiving the buyer's down payment. This
raises the question of whether the innocent holder is liable for the
down payment to the buyer. It has been held that where the holder,
which is usually a finance company, does not receive a benefit from
the down payment, it is under no duty to restore it. 0 The buyer must
look to the seller for its recovery.
Formal and Substantive Violations
Whether the conditional seller violates the statute "formally" or
"substantively," is of great importance and leads to different legal
results. If the seller merely violates the statute "formally," there is
no penalty imposed against him. The contract becomes unenforceable
20 This purpose differs from that in the Unruh Act CA.. Cry. CODE §§ 1801-12.9,
Note, Installment Sales: Purpose of Unruh Act; Comparison With Automobile Sales Legis-
lation, p. 312 infra.
27 Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 574, 203 P.2d 758, 765 (1949);
Foster v. Masters Pontiac Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 481, 488, 322 P.2d 592, 595 (1958);
Williams v. Caruso Enterprises, 140 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 978, 295 P.2d 592, 596
(1956).
28 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle supra note 24, at -, 351 P.2d at 774,
4 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
29 Baum v. Aleman, 139 Cal. App. 2d. Supp. 929, 933, 293 P.2d 162, 164.
30 United States Credit Bureau v. Sanders, 103 Cal. App. 2d 806, 230 P.2d 849
(1951).
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and each party is required to return the other's consideration. The-
oretically, an equitable result is thus attained. But, the depreciation
of the motor vehicle while in the buyer's possession and use disrupts
the supposed equity. The courts' recognition of this factor has led
to the allowance of an offset in favor of the seller.31 They have shown
consistency in so holding, although the proper method of computing
the offset has been a source of uncertainty.
The statute has been interpreted not to be punitive in nature.3 2
This would, of course, be correct where the seller merely violates the
statute "formally." But, it does become punitive where the seller vio-
lates the statute "substantively." If the seller violates either (c) or
(d) (time price differential and refund credit provisions) making it
an intentional "substantive" violation, then (e) has been held to im-
pose a penalty by refusal of an offset."3 The rights of the buyer are
then, the recovery of whatever consideration he has given up to the
seller.
The penalty, however, is not extended against the innocent holder
of the contract.34 This necessitates an action against the original seller.
It should be noted, that although the seller is entitled to an offset
because of the buyer's use, the buyer is not allowed a similar set-off
for the use of the automobile traded in by him.35 A buyer is, how-
ever, given full protection under subdivision (b) where the seller
charges as part of the consideration an amount supposedly for insur-
ance. The subdivision makes it implicit upon him to secure insurance
within thirty days.' 6 Where there has been such a recitation in the
contract and the seller assigns the contract, the duty may fall on the
assignee to secure the insurance. This is based on the theory of con-
structive notice of the seller's failure to secure the insurance. Thus,
should the buyer become involved in an accident, he has a cause of
31 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal. 2d -- , 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 496 (1960); City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851
(1959).
32 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, supra note 31 at -- , 351 P.2d at 774,
4 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
33 Lewis v. Muntz Car Co., 50 Cal. 2d 681, 328 P.2d 968 (1958). In the 1945 version
of CAL. CirV. CODE § 2982, Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 1030, § 2, p. 1992, subd. (c) provided
that, except for an accidental or bona fide error in computation, should the seller violate
the restriction on the amount of the time price differential, the contract was unenforceable
and the buyer could recover three times the total amount paid on the contract balance.
Since 1949, however, subd. (e), the successor of the original subd. (c), merely gives the
buyer a civil action to recover the total amount paid on the contract balance where the
seller violates either the time price differential or refund credit provisions.
34 United States Credit Bureau v. Sanders, supra note 30 at 816, 230 P.2d at 855. See
also Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 ConNIELL L.Q. 38,
69 (1958).
35 Williams v. Caruso Enterprises, 140 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 981, 295 P.2d 592,
597.
36 CAL. CrV. CODE § 2982(b).
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action against the assignee for damages for failure to secure insurance
where a charge had been made as part of the consideration.
37
The seller who has violated the statute can enforce the legal pro-
vision for return of the vehicle upon the buyer's default, although he
may not enforce the contract as a whole. This right to enforce repos-
session passes to an assignee based on the rules of non-negotiable
instruments and is, therefore, subject to the buyer's defenses and
counterclaims.38 Thus, a seller or assignee who seeks to repossess
because of the buyer's default, is subject to the latter's counterclaim
for return of whatever consideration the buyer has given up where
the seller has violated the statute.
Computing the Adjustment
The great problem, then, is not the enforceability of the contract,
nor the rights and liability of the buyer, seller, or assignee, but the
method of computing an equitable adjustment figure. Several the-
ories have been suggested by the courts as to what is the proper
method to compt~te the offset. An early case,3 9 held that the seller
is entitled to damages for the buyer's use of a truck while in the latter's
possession. The amount was to be based on the circumstances under
which the truck was used, the cost of operation, and the customary
rental charge for the use of trucks of similar character. The rental
theory has received little support.40 Another method of computing
the offset is the "reasonable use"41 of the vehicle idea. This differs
from the rental theory in that the seller cannot expect to realize any
profit in the offset. But, a recovery for "reasonable use" is a catch-all
phrase which fails to tell "how much" the seller is entitled to. The
Kyle case followed the method of offset first expounded in the Wil-
liams case. In refusing to follow the rental basis the court said that
"... such measure would improperly allow the seller a profit, and the
seller can in no event recover on the theory of offset more than an
amount equal to that which the buyer is entitled to recover."42 The
computation in the Williams case was based on an amount repre-
senting the depreciation in value of the vehicle through use by the
buyer while in his possession. Furthermore, the offset is not to ex-
ceed that to which the buyer is entitled. Prior to the Kyle case, but
37 King v. Curtis, 133 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 806, 284 P.2d 983 (1955).
38 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal. 2d -, -, 351 P.2d 768, 775,
4 Cal. Rptr. 496, 503.
39 Pendell v. Warren, 101 Cal. App. 407, 281 Pac. 658 (1929).
4O Adams v. Caruso Enterprises Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 403, 285 P.2d 1022 (1955),
is the only recent case holding the rental theory to be the proper method to determine the
seller's offset.
41 United States Credit Bureau v. Sanders, 103 Cal. App. 2d 806, 816, 230 P.2d 849,
855; Baum v. Aleman, 139 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 929, 933, 293 P.2d 162, 164.
42 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal. 2d , , 351 P.2d 768,
774,4 Cal. Rptr. 496, 502.
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after the Williams case, it was suggested that perhaps there can be
no proper method of ascertaining a proper offset figure.4 3 This ob-
servation may prove to be practically accurate. Nevertheless with
the Kyle, Lewis v. Muntz Car Co.4 and City Lincoln-Mercury v. Lind-
sey 45 employing the depreciation theory, this appears to be the Cali-
fornia method of adjusting the offset.
On the other hand, the buyer's recovery is limited to the amount
of cash payments made and if an automobile was traded in, he is
entitled to the actual retail value of the automobile.46 He is not en-
titled to the amount the contract allowed in trade. This adds to the
adjustment problem in that the actual retail value of the traded-in
automobile must be found.
Conclusion
From a practical view point, the California statute governing the
conditional sale of a motor vehicle waves but a "small stick." Al-
though directed toward the philosophy of disclosure, because of the
hazards a conditional buyer may encounter there is no significant
provision to compel disclosure. Starting with the premise that Cali-
fornia abhors forfeiture, it follows that the solution is based on the
theory of placing the parties in their respective positions prior to the
execution of the unenforceable contract. Thus, the seller, by return-
ing the consideration of the buyer less an offset, may recover the
motor vehicle. With the exception of an intentional "substantive" vio-
lation where an offset is refused, how can these legal results "force" a
seller to disclose all items required in the conditional contract?
It cannot be denied that the statute has merit. But, the seller who
does violate the statute "formally" by not disclosing all items required
suffers no great loss in having the contract declared unenforceable.
He merely returns the buyer's consideration, less an offset. Since the
courts will probably follow the Kyle decision in basing the offset on
depreciation of the vehicle through use, and since depreciation is such
a variable, the innocent purchaser may possibly recover but a fraction
of his payments. With this result, the buyer may actually be penal-
ized where the offset is allowed. By requiring him to return the ve-
hicle, the seller loses nothing but prospective profit. But, in allowing
an offset, the buyer actually loses that portion of his money payments.
Yet, the purpose of the statute was for his benefit. On the other hand,
the seller has the repossessed vehicle and upon a resale, may be able
to recover his prospective loss of profit. Even though he cannot re-
cover a deficiency from the buyer where he has violated the statute,
it would seem that such legal results will not deter non-disclosure.
43 Dube v. Kelley Kar Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 862, 341 P.2d 774 (1959).
44 50 Cal. 2d 681, 328 P.2d 968 (1958).
45 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
46 Id. at 275, 339 P.2d at 856.
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Thus, it is apparent some definite rule ought to be established to
guide the courts in carrying out the purpose of this statute. Enacted
to protect the buyer, the statute could be interpreted so that it will
refuse an offset whether the violation is "formal" or "substantive."
This is not an unreasonable solution, for there is nothing in the statute
that restricts the refusal of an offset to "substantive" violations. It was
only through the courts' interpretation that an offset was refused in a
"substantive" violation of the statute by the seller. The statute itself
makes no mention of an offset.
It might be argued that the legislature did not intend to penalize
the seller for merely "formal" violations. This argument would be
based on the amendment of the statute in 1949.47 This amendment
eliminated the buyer's right to triple recovery of the total amount
paid on the contract balance. This might indicate a reluctance to
penalize for either type of violation. But, the courts have gone ahead
and imposed a penalty where there has been a "substantive" viola-
tion. Thus, even in the light of the amendment, if the courts have
refused to allow an offset in the cases of "substantive" violations, it is
conceivable to refuse it also in "formal "violations. With the legisla-
ture silent as to when an offset should be allowed, the courts might
possibly interpret the statute so that it will be refused in either type
of violation. And if "formal" violation cases continue to command most
of the courts' time, the refusal of an offset might curb much of the
litigation.
47 Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1594, § 1, p. 2842 amended the 1945 version of CAL. CrV.
CODE § 2982 so that buyer was no longer entitled to recover three times the total amount
paid on the contract balance when the seller violated the time price differential provision.
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